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CYBER WAR, CYBERED CONFLICT, AND THE 
MARITIME DOMAIN
 It has been well over a decade since the first “prophets” of information warfare proclaimed a new age of conflict fought not just on air, sea, and land but with 
electrons in what came to be known as “cyberspace�”1 Since these early predic-
tions, many incidents have confirmed that criminals, random hackers, and 
government-sanctioned specialists can wreak havoc on governments, military 
communications systems, and corporations� The Stuxnet worm alone helped 
delay—by months, perhaps years—the long-standing efforts of Iran to acquire 
sufficient nuclear material to build nuclear weapons�2 Recent revelations of hack-
ing campaigns against such publications as the Wall Street Journal and New York 
Times have broadened concerns to include even the integrity of American demo-
cratic institutions�3 Meanwhile, the commander of U�S� Cyber Command has 
characterized cyber attacks designed to gain access to the intellectual property 
of American corporations as the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history�”4 
How cyber assaults and government responses have been interpreted is not 
uniform, however, especially with regard to whether the world will eventually 
engage in “cyber war�”5 There is a community of scholars and analysts who argue 
that cyber war will not happen or that the impact of cyberspace on armed conflict 
will be limited�6 Others in the broad field of security studies, traditional com-
puter science, or corporate communities claim that while some form of conflict 
is happening, government officials, military officers, and legislators are suffering 
from “threat inflation�” They argue that hyperbolic projections are leading to bad 
policy decisions, especially with regard to specific adversaries, and that there has 
been overinvestment in offensive cyber weapons rather than prudent defensive 
measures�7 A best-selling nonfiction book has been criticized for contributing 
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unnecessarily to public fears about the potential for cyber warfare�8 Many of 
these critics argue that what are being called “cyber attacks” are really instances 
of espionage, allowed by international law, or simply crime, which is not the 
mission area of the nation’s military services�9 Some analysts detect the influence 
of the military-industrial complex on policy debates� If hackers, official or not, 
from China and Russia, terrorists, and criminals use the Internet to penetrate U�S 
government systems, contractors see opportunities for increased revenue� As two 
observers of cyberspace argue, “There’s an arms race in cyberspace, and a mas-
sively exploding new cyber-industrial complex that serves it�”10
Our position on this ongoing debate is that neither side has it right� Those 
who have hyped cyber war as a completely new phenomenon or insist that cyber 
threats are impossible to anticipate have missed key continuities with the past� 
Especially missing is an underlying understanding about how humans and tech-
nologies have evolved and how the ways in which we analyze the cyber arena will 
contribute to future conflicts� Despite the complexity of cyberspace, it is possible 
to understand the broad trends in conflict and institutional responses� Those 
who dismiss cyber war as mere hype or as driven by potential profits dismiss 
much too quickly growing evidence of the importance of cyber operations for 
the Navy and the nation� 
Many participants in the debates on cyber conflict demonstrate insufficient 
understanding of cyberspace� In particular, they do not demonstrate sufficient 
command of the level of integration across public and private systems, across 
sectors from economic to defense, and across levels of criticality in key societal 
functions� For example, in earlier eras, one or even many bank heists could 
not have taken down significant portions of the American financial system� In 
contrast, what has been characterized as a single-digit mistake crashed the New 
York Stock Exchange for several hours in 2010�11 In August 2013, the Amazon 
“cloud” suddenly stopped working for hours, with no public explanation; the 
best estimate is that during that period 40 percent of the Internet vanished in the 
United States—that is, there was simply 40 percent less activity�12 What is labeled 
espionage by observers seeing only a few incidents at a time can have cumulative 
effects on deeply integrated national systems� Distinguishing between what is 
crime and what espionage is not easy, nor is determining what actually represents 
a long-term campaign of deceptive attacks� To make such distinctions clearly 
requires recognition, in the first place, of the implications of extreme integration 
for security in modern society� Critics often have considerable difficulty with this 
cognitive leap—which is particularly unfortunate, as many of these critics have 
considerable influence in national and international policy� 
In this article we will attempt to explain the challenges and opportunities 
of cyberspace for U�S� national security, especially naval forces� First, we will 
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examine how cyberspace has affected conflict over the last decade and how it 
will do so in the coming decades� Next, we will review how the U�S� government 
has responded to the increasing number and variety of attacks on its own institu-
tions and on the private sector at home and abroad� Third, we will focus on the 
institutional evolution of the U�S� Navy as it attempts to fulfill the responsibilities 
assigned to it by national-level strategies within the framework of its traditional 
missions, capabilities, and culture� Finally, we will examine the specific systemic 
operational challenges and opportunities posed by cyber operations� Our intent 
is to help naval scholars, analysts, and operators begin understanding the new 
world of cybered conflict in the maritime environment�13 
CONFLICT AND CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace has opened up new avenues of conflict, added layers of complexity 
to existing tactics and operations, and become increasingly influential in the 
strategic calculus of several major powers in the international system� Cyber-
space is neither totally new nor totally out of control, but it is now a global socio-
technical-economic system with major effects on the physical, economic, and 
societal security of nations� Cyberspace has made it much too easy for aggressive 
states and nonstate actors to reach remotely into other societies, threaten critical 
government systems, and affect essential operations of both public and private 
institutions�14 The question is how to characterize this new reality�
Although “cyber war” has entered into the common lexicon, we generally 
avoid the term, because it misleads more than it illuminates� Instead, we prefer 
the term “cybered conflict�”15 The phrase characterizes the essential nature of 
modern military operations, from peacetime to high-intensity warfare� Cyber 
activities by military forces (and often intelligence agencies, law-enforcement 
organizations, and associated departments) take place in all types of conflict, dur-
ing all phases of military operations, and at all levels of war� From our perspec-
tive, cybered conflict characterizes the whole spectrum of old and new forms of 
conflict born of, enabled through, or dramatically altered by cyberspace�
All Phases of Military Operations Are Now Cybered 
U�S� joint doctrine posits a notional six-phase model of joint and combined 
military operations, ranging from Phase Zero (“Shaping”) through Phase III 
(“Dominate,” or “breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in non-
combat situations, control of the operational environment”) to Phase V (“Enable 
Civil Authority”)�16 For our purposes here, the details of what occurs in each 
phase are less important than the fact that cyber tools, skills, units, and percep-
tions play roles in all of them� Whether shaping the future operating environment 
by preparing for long-running conflicts of varying tempos and effects or for 
cybered conflicts ranging from disruptions of critical systems to cyber-enabled 
NWC_Spring2014Review.indb   73 2/14/14   1:08 PM
3
Dombrowski and Demchak: Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
 7 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
destruction of military forces, American military specialists (including naval 
officers and sailors) and their civilian counterparts from the intelligence agen-
cies and the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security use a wide range of 
offensive and defensive tools to support actions in the physical world� At each 
stage they also have to defend against the efforts of adversaries—whether official 
state representatives, terrorists, or criminals—trying to thwart American or allied 
operations or to exploit them for their own ends� 
All Levels of War Are Now Cybered
Classic national-security scholarship as taught at institutions of professional mili-
tary education in the United States divides thinking about war into three levels: 
tactics, operations, and strategy� According to joint doctrine, “strategy is a prudent 
idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchro-
nized and integrated fashion to achieve theater and multinational objectives�” By 
contrast, “tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in rela-
tion to each other�” For its part, “the operational level links strategy and tactics by 
establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and 
strategic objectives� It sequences tactical actions to achieve objectives�”17
Our position is again straightforward� Cybered conflict enters into play at all 
three levels and connects them iteratively and systemically� At the strategic level, 
national policies must provide commanders with the goals for cyberspace (and 
to which cyber operations must contribute) and guidance regarding how cyber 
instruments may be used consistent with national law, as well as means to acquire 
and operate those tools� At the tactical level, commanders must fight battles using 
not only kinetic means but also offensive and defensive cyber instruments� As 
joint doctrine observes, all three levels overlap during the execution of a military 
operation; therefore, “commanders and their staffs at all levels must anticipate 
how their plans, operations, and actions may impact the other levels (those above 
and those below)�”18 
All Types of Conflict Are Now Cybered
Typologies of conflict are many� The Department of Defense defines nineteen 
types of warfare, ranging from acoustic to undersea�19 These various definitions 
usually speak to the environment, factors, and conditions that must be under-
stood to apply combat power successfully, protect the force, or complete the 
mission� These elements might include enemy and friendly armed forces, infra-
structure, weather, terrain, and the electromagnetic spectrum within operational 
zones and areas of interest�20 
U�S� military forces now prepare to fight in five domains:21 land, sea, air, space, 
and cyber� In 2011 “cyber” was added—not without some modest resistance—as 
the fifth domain, a nonphysical arena of military conflict�22 
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We believe, however, that for security and military purposes cyberspace is not 
a domain but a substrate� In our usage, a “substrate” is an underlying layer on 
which modern society is built� Cyberspace uniquely underpins all four other war-
fighting domains� This substrate has a topology that is largely and (surprisingly 
to some) territorial� Our argument that cyberspace is a substrate is thus contrary 
to official usage and to increasingly commonplace assertions that cyberspace is 
a domain�23 One reason that cyberspace is in fact not strictly a domain is that it 
is a built environment—imagined, created, developed, sustained, and extended 
by human intentions and actions� One analyst has noted “the generative capac-
ity for unrelated and unaccredited audiences to build and distribute code and 
content through the Internet�”24 As Michael Hayden, a retired Air Force general 
and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, once pointed out to an 
audience of technologists, “God made the other four [domains]� You made the 
last one� God did a better job�”25 
One implication of cyberspace’s being a built environment is that it can be 
unbuilt, remodeled, and perhaps in an extreme case even destroyed (say, by 
electromagnetic pulse), at least temporarily and within spatial limits� This logic, 
then, allows for the notion that an Internet “kill switch” exists or can be created� 
No less an authority than the founder and chairman of Microsoft, Bill Gates, ac-
knowledges that the Internet can be “switched off ”: “It’s not that hard to shut the 
Internet down if you have military power where you can tell people that’s what’s 
going to happen,” Gates said� “Whenever you do something extraordinary like 
that you’re sort of showing people you’re afraid of the truth getting out, so it’s a 
very difficult tactic, but certainly it can be shut off�”26 In several recent conflicts, 
governments, including those of Egypt and Syria, have in effect flipped the switch 
to turn off Internet access, however imperfectly, for their societies� The strategic, 
operational, and tactical objectives of these acts are unclear at this point� More-
over, the effects have been temporary, as experts inside and outside the countries 
work to make alternative connections� 
Since World War II, the trajectory of U�S� military planning has favored joint 
operations, with the services fighting together from their respective domains� As 
we will discuss below, the services and a number of government agencies (for ex-
ample, the National Security Agency, or NSA) share responsibility for operating 
in cyberspace, defending military and civilian systems and infrastructure, and, 
ultimately, conducting cyber operations as part of kinetic operations� But un-
like the four other official war-fighting domains recognized by the government, 
cyberspace, as a substrate, as we have noted, intersects with all the others, and it 
is vulnerable to widespread disruption� This makes cyberspace all the more valu-
able; it is in effect the technological high ground, for not only the military and 
intelligence services but government, civilian, and commercial sectors as well�
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Cyberspace is thus not a separate conflict space or host to a particular type of 
conflict� Cybered conflict occurs along a spectrum that includes conflicts from 
large to small—total war, small wars, wars of choice, and a host of others� In the 
next twenty years, the tools of cyberspace will become so ubiquitous that we pre-
fer to use the adjective “cybered,” since “cyber” is likely to be taken for granted 
and abandoned� In the meantime, cyberspace is changing how governments 
and their militaries and nonstate actors fight wars and conflicts� Organizing and 
operating in joint, interagency, and combined (with friends, partners, and allies) 
terms for cybered conflicts are not only sensible but strategically and operation-
ally essential for success� 
NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE 
Given their decades-old and growing dependence on information and com-
munications technologies for economic dominance and military power, the U�S� 
military and government agencies have slowly developed policies, strategies, and 
organizations to meet the challenges and possibilities of cyberspace� High-level 
recognition of threats emanating from “cyber” began as early as the 1990s� In 
1996 President William Clinton’s Executive Order 13010 created the President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which included threats to the 
nation’s economic and national security from cyber attacks within the scope of its 
activities�27 Two years later, on the basis of the commission’s recommendations, 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 established several cyber security–related 
organizations, largely focused on malicious hackers or criminals who could 
threaten critical national infrastructure� 
The full extent of cyber threats became pressing after 9/11� That terrorists 
could use the web to organize themselves to attack the United States and other 
adversaries was becoming clear� In one high-profile example, documents found 
in abandoned Al Qaeda houses after the U�S� invasion of Afghanistan included 
guidance from Osama Bin Laden on how to use electronic means to continue the 
jihad and suggesting that 90 percent of Al Qaeda’s future efforts would involve 
cyberspace�28 
Chinese strategists have begun to develop their own concepts of cyber conflict, 
focusing on major state adversaries, including the United States�29 The Persian 
Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated to China (and other close observers) how high-
technology militaries could defeat adversaries who had advantages in troop 
strength� The stunning results of U�S� operations against numerically superior 
forces presented a major challenge to China’s perception of its own advantages in 
future conflict—massed assets ranging from manpower to ships and missiles� Ac-
cording to some scholars, China’s search for a compensating strategy to match the 
United States led it to rediscover Sun Tzu’s understanding of “indirect warfare�”30 
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Several Chinese colonels even proposed a concept of “unconstrained warfare,” 
a campaign that begins long before any armed conflict is apparent� This “war-
fare” seeks to disrupt potential enemies using the vulnerabilities of their (real or 
potential) information systems, without regard for international norms or laws� 
As a Western analyst concludes, “China [now] has the most extensive and most 
practiced cyber-warfare capabilities in Asia, although the technical expertise is 
very uneven�”31
By 2003, President George W� Bush signed several strategy documents focus-
ing specifically on cyberspace� Rather than subsuming specific issues under a 
general concern for critical infrastructure, as President Clinton had done, the Na-
tional Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the Comprehensive National Cybersecu-
rity Initiative specifically addressed the need to secure cyberspace and presented 
that mission as a systemic challenge� These documents divided responsibility 
for national cyber security among the Department of Defense (DoD), the newly 
established Department of Homeland Security, and the White House itself� While 
the White House retained overall policy authority, Homeland Security was given 
the task of ensuring “critical infrastructure protection” of the homeland—but in 
terms of a “coordinating,” not regulating or operating, mission� DoD was charged 
with protecting its own global grid of computers and communications systems 
but received no authority to inform or protect anyone else’s network, even if 
their health determined whether the DoD’s own Global Information Grid could 
be protected� The Department of Defense and its subagencies rely heavily on 
commercial networks to transfer data across the globe;32 nevertheless, individual 
federal agencies, states, and private corporations were left by and large to defend 
themselves�33 
Even with the increased attention by the Bush administration to cyber se-
curity, the breadth of the nation’s vulnerability was not yet fully apparent� In 
2003 only 60 percent of the American population owned computers, and only 
50 percent had personal access to an Internet connection�34 Pressure on officials 
and policy makers would increase as more citizens, businesses, and government 
activities came to depend on uninterrupted information and assured access to 
cyberspace, to include the Internet, the World Wide Web, and over time, peer-
to-peer computer networks� 
Toward the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the unsettling successes of 
the cyber penetrations, extractions, and remote “backdoor” operations mounted 
steadily across DoD and other agencies�35 Existing (“legacy”) information-
assurance policies, programs, and tools were failing to stem the tide of attacks� 
To make matters worse, a growing portion of publicly revealed data on cyber 
attacks pointed toward the existence of a small but global population of highly 
skilled, determined, and persistent “wicked actors�”36 Their successes were often 
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discovered only months or years later, long after the damage had been done� In 
2006, the Bush administration issued another series of documents to clarify top-
level policies, procedures, and responsibilities� The National Security Strategy and 
Quadrennial Defense Review outlined the broad bases for U�S� government poli-
cies for dealing with cyber war and cyber threats more generally, within the wider 
context of conventional threats and the evolving international environment�37 
Most notably, the Department of Defense published its National Military 
Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, which assigned U�S� Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) and the Joint Staff to develop an implementation plan for the 
defense of cyberspace�38 The concept of a joint command to deal with cyberspace 
gradually emerged from this planning effort� The timing of the decision to create 
a unified cyber command was influenced by the well-intentioned miscalculation 
of several senior Air Force leaders who in 2005–2006 unilaterally declared their 
service the lead agency for cyber security� Publicity associated with an Air Force 
effort to develop a national cyber command may have prompted Robert Gates, 
then Secretary of Defense, to become involved directly in laying the foundation 
for a DoD-wide command for cyberspace operations�39 Meanwhile, the other 
services, including the Navy, had begun preparing to create cyber-security and 
-warfare units of their own�40 
During roughly the same period, 2004–2007, General James E� Cartwright, as 
commander of STRATCOM, was struck by the magnitude of ongoing assaults on 
DoD networks� He became concerned by massive losses of classified internal data 
and by the constant flood of attacks experienced� General Cartwright’s efforts 
to protect STRATCOM and DoD itself from cyber threats fueled the design of 
a major command devoted to cyberspace� In particular, he argued that the new 
organization should be a “subunified” command (that is, a subordinate unified 
command, reporting in this case to STRATCOM) so that it would be less likely to 
be marginalized� General Cartwright continued to sponsor the idea of a national 
cyber command when he became the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in 2007�41 It would, however, take more than the interest of a vice chief to create 
such a command�
In late 2008 a computer “worm” infected unclassified and classified Ameri-
can networks, traveling via USB memory sticks from infected computers in 
Afghanistan to DoD systems across the globe� The worm opened so-called back 
doors that potentially allowed adversaries to control infected systems� Upon 
discovering the breach, DoD rapidly closed down networks and restricted the 
use of USB sticks and most removable media, to stop reinfection�42 This infec-
tion was followed closely by the “Conficker” worm, which targeted the Microsoft 
Windows operating system used by the armed services of many NATO members, 
including the United States� Conficker spread quickly and opened new back 
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doors accessible to unknown attackers�43 For a period, someone, somewhere, had 
remote access to computer networks on NATO warships in port and to systems 
used by combat units in the field�44 These back-to-back infections changed the 
priority given cyber security by the White House and DoD�45
By the spring of 2009, experts generally accepted that protecting the gov-
ernment, and particularly DoD, against Conficker and a host of other cyber 
threats would require major new steps�46 During the first year of President 
Barack Obama’s administration, the urgency increased substantially; investiga-
tive reporting has revealed that the president and his closest national-security 
team were not only working on defensive measures but contemplating offensive 
actions using cyber weapons�47 Upon taking office the Obama administration 
ordered a “60-Day Cyberspace Policy Review,” spearheaded by Melissa Hathaway, 
a former Bush administration cyber-security expert, to shape the fundamentals 
for future cyber-security strategic and organizational changes�48 In May 2009, 
with the review complete, President Obama declared cyberspace to be a first-tier 
priority for national security� The White House Cyberspace Policy Review stated 
that “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national 
security problems facing the new administration�”49 
In June 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced the formation of a new 
U�S� Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) as a subunified command subordinate to 
STRATCOM and collocated it with the government’s main source of computer 
and electronic expertise, the NSA� To ease the flow of information between the 
two organizations, the director of NSA was to be “dual-hatted” as the com-
mander of CYBERCOM� The arrangement allowed at least one clear point where 
authorities granted by Title 10 and Title 50 of the U.S. Code could be balanced 
and decisive actions taken�50 Furthermore, a single leader could review all op-
erations, emerging trends, and long-range effects to develop and coordinate 
comprehensive tactics, operations, and strategies� In principle, then, the orga-
nizational structure allowed the new command to deal with the complexity of 
cybered conflict� “Cyber warriors” in Cyber Command and the intelligence and 
information experts of the National Security Agency would in this way more 
readily collaborate to detect, track, thwart, or stop adversaries crippling DoD’s 
operational readiness�51 
The individual military services had equally important roles in foreseeing 
threats, defending their mission areas and forces, and disrupting cyber attacks 
“forward�” In a June 2009 DoD memorandum, Secretary Gates asked each of the 
service secretaries to establish a component to support Cyber Command, a com-
ponent that “possesses the required technical capability [to secure freedom of 
action in cyberspace] and remains focused on the integration of cyberspace op-
erations� Further, this command must be capable of synchronizing war-fighting 
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effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil 
authorities and international partners�”52 Each service was to stand up an interim 
command by 1 October 2009 and to have it fully operational by 1 October 2010� 
The services were allowed to design their own organizations and to incorpo-
rate skills, tools, and units as they saw fit, as long as all were able to contribute to 
the mission of U�S� Cyber Command� The Navy and Air Force in particular had 
already made considerable progress, in anticipation of the order� Meanwhile, the 
Department of Homeland Security was instructed to reinvigorate its efforts to 
persuade the critical infrastructure community—largely privately held—to im-
prove its defenses against remote attacks� By midsummer of 2010, all the services 
had established rudimentary cyber commands� The process of reconciling dif-
ferences in structure, guidance, and mission then began in earnest� This process 
continues unabated today, and we will later discuss its implications for the Navy�
In May 2011 the Obama administration outlined its publicly releasable, ex-
ternal policies in the International Strategy for Cyberspace;53 the Secretary of 
Defense issued the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 
two months later�54 Each statement aimed to inform the American public and 
the publics of allied states that the United States is taking cyber threats seriously� 
These documents also signaled to adversaries that preying on American targets 
would no longer be easy or risk-free� The U�S� government would defend itself 
and strike back as necessary�55 
THE NAVY AND CYBERSPACE
At the time of the July 2009 Gates memo, the Navy was already designing new 
organizations capable of meeting cyber challenges� The Navy had spent most of 
the 2000–2008 period trying to understand the threats posed by cyber attacks 
and intrusions�56 It had established a task force to study how attacks through 
cyberspace were affecting Navy assets and operational readiness� The task force’s 
members understood early that the service needed to identify cyber-capable 
personnel with skill sets ranging from intelligence techniques to network systems 
and electronic warfare� In the fall of 2009, Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of 
Naval Operations, stood up Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet�57 
The new cyber-focused command needed to provide the entire Navy with 
the specific missions, guidance, technical tools, and unit-level organizational 
structures necessary for cyber defense and offense� However, in doing so it had 
to work within the traditional fleet structure, to be compatible with the structures 
and missions of existing numbered fleets, and to serve as the Navy component 
supporting U�S� Cyber Command as a whole� The task force’s members had also 
known—drawing on the longtime, well-established relationship between the 
U�S� Navy intelligence community and the National Security Agency—that the 
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complexity of cyberspace as an operational environment would demand rapid, 
accurate responses at tempos commensurate with the scale and harm of the 
threats� These qualities would be exceptionally difficult to achieve if cyber was 
not mainstreamed across the service� These responses would be nearly impos-
sible to execute rapidly if bureaucratic “silos” were left in place between the Navy 
and joint intelligence, electronic warfare, network administration, and cryptol-
ogy, among other specialized organizations�58 
In January 2010, when Fleet Cyber Command (known as FCC, or Fleet 
Cyber) was declared operational as the Navy’s component of CYBERCOM, its 
organization was unique among its service counterparts� Rather than splitting 
combat-support functions, such as intelligence, from operational combat mis-
sions as other services have done, its structure integrates them and thereby sup-
ports both U�S� Cyber Command and the Navy’s own requirements� A single flag 
officer leads not only FCC, an Echelon 2 command (i�e�, reporting directly to the 
Chief of Naval Operations), but also the newly recommissioned Tenth Fleet, as a 
subordinate Echelon 3 command—an institutional design intended to allow the 
Navy to act quickly in a hostile and deeply cybered world�59 
Nonetheless, and despite the best efforts of their designers, leaders, and cham-
pions, Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet have not found it easy to meet 
the challenges of cyberspace� First, both have themselves been assaulted from 
cyberspace even as they experience the normal growing pains of a new command 
structure� Second, long-standing internal divisions in the naval service have com-
plicated their manning, training, equipment, employment, and assessment� In-
side and outside the Navy numerous debates are ongoing about what constitutes 
the cybered conflict space and even whether it is truly a “domain,” as designated 
by DoD� Among its critics are some who fear change, some (a small number) who 
understand computer systems, and even optimists convinced that a fully integrat-
ed approach to cyberspace would achieve nearly everything that might be done 
in the physical world� In brief, like much of the U�S� government, CYBERCOM, 
and its counterparts in the other services, Fleet Cyber Command is still learning 
its own missions, strengths, weaknesses, and evolving opportunities�60
In late November 2012 the Navy took several other steps toward sustain-
ing cyber capabilities� The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information 
Dominance / Director of Naval Intelligence (Vice Admiral Kendall L� Card) and 
Commander, U�S� Fleet Cyber Command / Tenth Fleet (Vice Admiral Michael S� 
Rogers) signed three documents:
• Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance 2013–2017 61
• Navy Cyber Power 202062 
• Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017�63
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Each demonstrates the evolution of Navy thinking about how to serve, survive, 
and excel in a cybered maritime environment� It is too soon to evaluate fully the 
Navy’s progress in effective cybered conflict� It is time, however, to relate the 
Navy’s thinking to what is coming in the dynamically evolving global cyberspace� 
Trends already evident across the digitized world will affect future military con-
flict, the cyber threat environment in the maritime domain, and the Navy’s own 
efforts to establish organizational and operational frameworks for meeting cyber 
challenges in the near-to-medium term� Several of these trends will impact the 
Navy’s ability to fulfill the “sailing direction” issued by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, that “cyberspace will be operationalized with 
capabilities that span the electromagnetic spectrum—providing superior aware-
ness and control when and where we need it�”64
THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERED CONFLICT IN THE MARITIME 
DOMAIN
What is different about the challenges facing U�S� naval forces during cybered 
conflicts?65 How can naval forces contribute to combined and joint operations 
that include cyber operations? The problem is not just that the cyberspace sub-
strate connects most of the world and allows intrusions from a wide range of state 
and nonstate actors� Rather, we argue, it is that cyberspace favors the offensive 
military capabilities of adversaries and enhances their potentially destabilizing 
effects on the nature and level of interstate conflict in the coming years�66 
The offense/defense balance in international affairs has long been consid-
ered critical to the prospects for the reduction of conflict and the promotion 
of international peace�67 Recent scholarship concludes, at least preliminarily, 
that “innovations in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) allow 
states to take greater risks and adopt more vigilant or offensive positions toward 
adversaries� Cyber capabilities do not cause armed conflict, but make decisions 
to escalate easier and cheaper�”68 Scholars are only now developing a serious re-
search program to understand the impact of offensive cyber instruments on the 
future of conflict�69 There are still scholars who remain skeptical about the utility 
of offense/defense theory for understanding the impact of technological change 
on war and peace or, more important, the effects of cyber operations� One, for 
example, argues, “This is not to say that cyber attacks would have no effect, only 
that they are extremely unlikely to prove strategically decisive� A capability to 
address cyber threats is then useful, but planning for cyber warfare must be con-
ducted within the larger framework of recognition that these capabilities are not 
in fact a game changer�”70
In our view, the “game changing” aspects of cyberspace do not lie in cyber war-
fare at the high end of the spectrum of conflict� Rather, the strategically decisive 
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aspects of cyberspace concern the three significant advantages that its current 
globally unfettered structure offers attackers: relatively risk-free opportunities in 
the scale, proximity, and precision of cyber “weapons�” These advantages make 
attacks cheaper, easier, and more effective for both state and nonstate actors� 
While they may be temporary and transitional, they exist now, and in our judg-
ment they will continue to exist for the next fifteen to twenty years� 
First, like the superpowers of old, adversaries can readily use the web to scale 
attacking units from small to large, tightly organized or loosely linked� Further, 
attackers can use the web for communication, training, supply, and operations, 
even as they scale up and down and back again� For one example, they can 
cheaply scale up by buying, or even renting, “botnets” on the global black market� 
A botnet—a linked network of software hidden in millions of innocent comput-
ers—can be commanded to participate in attacks� Today there are hundreds of 
thousands of botnets in use, for sale, or lying dormant, on machines whose users 
do not know that they are infected�71
Second, to pose a threat, adversaries have no need to move into close physical 
proximity to collect critical information or to deploy long-range expensive weap-
ons� Relatively high-quality “signals intelligence” is now available to anyone with 
time and an Internet connection�72 Third, the precision in targeting is no longer 
constrained to line-of-sight, blue-water, or over-the-horizon military capabilities� 
Cyber-enabled attackers can vary the precision of their targeting from a single 
person to cities, regions, or entire nations� 
However, these three factors, notwithstanding the offensive advantages they 
offer attackers, may also provide opportunities for the U�S� Navy’s offensive and 
defensive cyber operations� 
Scale 
Given the reliance of global commerce; governments at all levels; and military, 
intelligence, and law-enforcement organizations on the communication systems 
and computers associated with cyberspace, the institutional scale required to 
cause real harm has dropped dramatically�73 Small organizations—including 
criminal enterprises, terrorist groups, and subunits of national militaries—can 
now use the Internet to spy on, harass, and attack with relatively modest invest-
ments in personnel and equipment� States with modest cyber resources can 
achieve disproportionate effects with appropriate tools, skill, and organizational 
structures� Small states might also achieve asymmetric advantages by investing in 
cyber instruments or employing proxies with better capabilities� 
Small, covert, and even part-time organizations scattered in large enough 
numbers across the globe can undercut traditional threat and warning indica-
tors employed by U�S� intelligence agencies� The modern military’s standard set 
of such indicators identifies emerging cyber threats much less effectively than it 
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does conventional attackers� For the Navy, as for the other services and govern-
ment agencies, it will be even harder to assess the cyber capabilities and inten-
tions of potential adversaries than to evaluate their conventional and nuclear 
forces� One pressing question urged by such uncertainty is how resilient the Navy 
can become� 
Proximity 
Until the modern era, most conflict was confined to visual range�74 For most of 
history, the farther an attacker from physical view, the less one could know about 
whether a given weapon or unit was the right choice to use against it, at that time, 
in that place� Even during the Cold War only major powers could develop and 
deploy large numbers of over-the-horizon weapons; they were expensive to build, 
required considerable long-distance intelligence to be effective, and outstripped 
standard damage-assessment techniques� 
Proximity thus mattered enormously for attackers�75 Intelligence was (and 
is) crucial for fighting and winning� Getting up close to look, and in a timely 
manner, was throughout history the most straightforward way to collect usable 
information� Critical and timely knowledge—the “signals intelligence” of super-
powers and close neighbors—has never, however, been cheap to acquire or easy 
to validate�76 
With the global connectivity of cyberspace, however, no longer does an en-
emy need to move into physical proximity to pose and execute a threat� Now 
too, adversaries both actual and potential can obtain intelligence inexpensively� 
If hackers can access a system and gain control of key functions, they can hide 
successes, elude defenses, and leave behind back doors by which to reenter in the 
future� Hackers need not be on the same continent as, let alone physically touch, 
targeted computers�77 
Often the information that cyber attackers need to target a system is already 
online, posted for legitimate reasons� Terrorist sites when raided are almost al-
ways found to contain caches of maps, specific data, and operationally relevant 
material on potential targets that had been harvested from publicly accessible 
Internet sites� Such information is often considered public information that 
must be provided to citizens, investors, and internal customers� Democratic 
norms and laws regarding transparency and accountability often encourage or 
even require government agencies and private enterprises to make available in-
formation that would be useful to cyber thieves, spies, and attackers� Public and 
private cyber-security experts have sought to discourage such “oversharing,” but 
most Western democracies have a long way to go� After the attacks on the United 
States in September 2001, for example, much public data about nuclear power 
plants and nation-spanning oil pipelines were removed from public websites 
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in the United States; such data had already been found in Al Qaeda computers 
seized in Afghanistan�78 
While great powers and some sophisticated states, like Israel, still enjoy com-
parative advantages in signals and various other technical means of collection 
and assessment, intelligence gaps between these states and their adversaries may 
be closing� Strategists, planners, and policy makers will eventually need to adapt 
to this new geostrategic reality of cyberspace�79 For maritime powers throughout 
history, forward-deployed fleets have been crucial for defeating land powers� Na-
val forces operating in theaters far from home could quickly and independently 
collect information and decide whether and how to act� Only peer maritime 
powers, and few land-based adversaries, could challenge that powerful capabil-
ity� The U�S� Navy is still in the business of long-distance power projection� In a 
cybered world, however, the task is more problematic� The Navy must adapt to 
the loss of its own proximity advantage� No longer will its bases, battle groups, 
forward infrastructure, and allied navies be immune just because they are over 
the horizon or far from the battle space� We believe that a more diffused set of 
threats and adversaries will be able to fight at a distance against the Navy and the 
nation� Another major research question for the Navy, then, is how to make prox-
imity matter again, how to regain its traditional operational advantages against 
cyber-capable foes� 
Precision 
The history of warfare demonstrates the many physical constraints on precision 
in choosing how often, where, and when to attack, given the size of the target and 
its ability to frustrate or defeat its attackers� Historically, precision has been ex-
pensive; few polities aside from empires, superpowers, and perhaps close neigh-
bors have had the means to target their enemies precisely, in order to achieve 
operational success or conserve resources� In a cyber attack or a conventional 
operation accompanied by cyber tactics, this constraint fades into merely a ques-
tion of time, knowledge, and occasionally patience� Attackers can now choose 
very specific targets—for today, for this tool, for this duration, and for this or 
that end� They can focus on individuals—by bank account, name, citizenship, 
location, or entertainment preference� They can also target specific firms, cities, 
or nations with similarly individualized parameters, with fairly small investment 
in readily available computer applications�80 
Correspondingly, adversaries can use imprecision strategically as well� Cyber 
attackers often intentionally build a certain amount of imprecision into their 
“weapons” to ensure they hit their intended targets� For example, to take down 
a particular subset of users of an innocent application, attackers can purchase 
destructive malicious software, such as a “Trojan,” on cyber crime’s global black 
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market;81 with it they can attack the application anywhere it is installed in the 
world� Among the victims will be their true targets; for the attackers, the others 
represent either irrelevant collateral damage or extra benefit� Such wider harm is 
rarely a concern to cybered attackers, except perhaps when the attack is under-
taken by state actors bound by international law�82 
In fact, when precision in the form of restraint is displayed, that characteristic 
itself suggests that the attackers are state actors� Usually only states concerned 
with international legitimacy try to avoid the potential for collateral damage 
posed by cyber weapons (Trojans, malware, etc�) that escape “into the wild�” One 
of the key indicators that a government had been involved in attacks on Estonia 
in 2007 was the degree of constraint exhibited in the timing, choice of targets, and 
duration� Many analysts presume that proxy actors were paid by Russian officials 
to attack Estonian targets but not beyond certain redlines�83 Precision, however, 
may also reflect organizational maturity and a wider view of the consequences 
of success, of failure, or of errors that send the attack spinning out of control�84 If 
true, the Russian actors behind the attacks showed restraint not because they had 
to but for their own reasons�85 
For the Navy and the U�S� military more generally, the development of preci-
sion weapons, both offensive and defensive, has long been a priority—at least 
since the development of the Norden bombsight in World War II�86 Precision in-
creases the effectiveness of weapons and reduces costs (although in direct terms 
this is contestable, given the per-unit cost of many precise weapons)� Professional 
militaries have often increased accuracy to decrease the volume of munitions 
employed, limit the number of aircraft sorties required, reduce (at least in theory) 
logistical expenses, and, ultimately, minimize collateral risks� At the same time, 
cost-effectiveness is said to lower the barriers to using coercion and reduction in 
collateral damage to increase the legitimacy of some forms of warfare, by some 
domestic and international observers�87 One of these has argued that “precision 
weaponry has revolutionized contemporary warfare by multiplying the effective-
ness of using air and ground power together�”88 In a similar fashion, cyber opera-
tions may, by changing the roles of scale, proximity, and precision in warfare, in-
crease the effectiveness of air, sea, land, and space operations when employed to 
reduce collateral damage and avoid risk to forces undertaking legitimate action�
In the cybered world, precision targeting is not necessarily an expensive op-
tion open only to major powers� Precision can help achieve aims without crossing 
redlines that might provoke wider kinetic conflict� Cybered conflict can occur 
along a spectrum across all phases of war, and long before any kinetic exchange, 
adversaries can use precision cyber tools to tilt the conflict in their favor� In par-
ticular, adversaries may use precise cyber weapons to undermine the resilience of 
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the targeted state’s military or infrastructure, or even its entire economic system, 
sometimes without declaring their intention or being identified as the attackers�
The critical research question here for the Navy is how to turn the offensive 
advantages of precision into a more costly liability for attackers� Standardiza-
tion in software and hardware systems, for example, can make offensive action 
easy for adversaries� The now-standard obligation to reduce costs by acquiring 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment often makes systems cheaper but 
more vulnerable in cybered conflicts� The U�S� military, including the Navy, 
might avoid providing the COTS advantage to potential adversaries by revising 
its acquisition process, to include the design of information architectures and 
the procurement of system components� It will require considerable ingenuity, 
but increasing variation within otherwise standardized equipment; off-the-shelf 
software architectures; and routine-driven procedures, units, or deployment pat-
terns may hold long-term benefits� 
Twenty years ago, the proponents of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) 
led by the U�S� military made all manner of claims for the impact of precision 
weapons on the future of conflict� This is not the place to wade into arguments 
about the nature of the RMA, past or present� But the impact of cyberspace on 
the scale, proximity, and precision of warfare, combined with the utility of cyber 
instruments in all phases, levels, and types of war, suggests a far greater impact 
for cyber than the classic RMA� By confronting directly the advantages of scale, 
proximity, and precision in cyber conflict, the Navy and CYBERCOM may both 
increase the effectiveness of traditional air, sea, land, and space operations and 
prepare for the inevitable more dynamic and complex cybered threat environ-
ment� In short, the challenge to the Navy is to reduce all three systemic advan-
tages for attackers: to make it harder for them to choose to be precise or not at 
their will, more difficult for their operations to be “close” though not physically 
close, and more expensive and personally risky for them to organize dispersed 
strangers or covertly to manipulate masses of distant innocent systems� 
THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CYBER “LITTORAL”
Cybered conflict is here to stay and must be taken seriously even if cyber war in 
the conventional sense—that is, resulting in combat deaths—is not likely� Cyber 
operations, both offensive and defensive, will play major roles in all levels of war 
(from terrorism and counterinsurgency to high-intensity conflict and all the 
gradations between)� Conflict involving cyber will neither stay wholly within 
networks nor prove over time to have been a fad or simply a subset of existing 
tactical, operational, or technological categories� From both empirical and con-
ceptual perspectives, cybered conflict is neither a “flash in the pan” or a “lesser 
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included case”; it has already proved to be an evolutionary force, slowly altering 
the likely future conditions for interstate competition and the potentials for ki-
netic forms of battle� Scholars, analysts, and, most important, operators need to 
think systematically about how cyber operations—offensive and defensive, to the 
extent that distinction still makes sense—affect tactics, operations, and strategies� 
Future military and security analyses of “cyber” writ large by the U�S� govern-
ment, or indeed that of any state, should adopt a systemic approach adapted 
from the logic of complex socio-technological systems and how new develop-
ments change what can be used by defenders and abused by adversaries� For 
example, since such systems are in reality “patterns of artifacts, institutions, rules 
and norms assembled and maintained to perform economic and social activi-
ties,” the Navy’s scholars and strategists need to think through what current and 
new technologies, from 3D printing and autonomous private vehicles to new 
materials, will do to change those patterns�89 Many current arguments about 
cyber operations in the government and policy communities are characterized 
by hype, false analogy, and, worse, misunderstanding of the technical, engineer-
ing, and scientific underpinning of the terms� Instead, the conversation should 
be about what is today being systematically lost, threatened, and penetrated on a 
vast scale� Furthermore, emergent technologies labeled “disruptive technologies” 
will change the calculus, some reducing scale, proximity, and precision obstacles 
even further, others offering opportunities to enhance barriers if the defenders 
are wise enough to see the opportunities�90
Cybered conflicts occur only partly inside computer and communications 
networks; what the Navy has viewed as the “littoral” in bounding its area of con-
cern (traditionally the intersection of the land and sea) is increasingly difficult 
to identify� Large sections of what matters to the maritime services now overlap 
with traditional military, intelligence, and even commercial operations across 
the nation and the globe� Furthermore, the internationally accepted rules of war 
are difficult to apply in cyber war� However, in the context of a broader notion of 
conflict (i�e�, as cybered conflict), these rules would find resonance with much 
of what happens before and during a kinetic conflict�91 Other well-known forms 
of conflict, such as hybrid warfare, asymmetric conflicts, and counterterrorism, 
are also cybered conflicts to the extent that key events depend on the cyberspace 
substrate�92
The U�S� government has struggled since the Clinton administration to 
adapt to the policy, legal, organizational, and operational demands of conflict 
in cyberspace� Progressing by fits and starts, key policy makers have reached 
a consensus that cyberspace is an important arena for conflict, one worthy of 
resources, specialized organizations, different interagency relationships, and 
eventually perhaps legislative action�93 Much remains to be done, especially with 
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regard to domestic policies, organizational implementation, and resourcing, but 
since the establishment of CYBERCOM and its service equivalents the defense 
and intelligence communities have become better equipped to meet external 
cyber challenges and take advantage of American cyber technologies to protect 
national interests� 
Two of the most likely and challenging scenarios for future crises, perhaps 
even shooting wars, will clearly involve cyber operations: Iran and North Ko-
rea�94 In each case, Phase Zero operations involving both sides, as well as third 
parties, already appear to involve cyber attacks of various types� If kinetic opera-
tions eventually take place, we may see the results of several decades of cyber 
“preparation of the battlefield,” ranging from tainted supply chains to embedded 
malware� For the time being, serious assessments and many details are obscure 
and will likely remain so until leaks and eventual declassification reveal the full 
extent of cyber operations�95 In the interim, a more systemic view will enable 
the United States, with its already-demonstrated considerable cyber capabilities 
in disruption work, to balance those capabilities with the resilience needed for 
robust “cyber power�” 
The Navy will be an integral part of that cyber power� The Navy has led 
service-level efforts in developing, deploying, operating, and sustaining com-
plex electronic systems in the past�96 Thanks to innovative institutional changes, 
it may be the service best positioned to integrate cyber fully into its culture, 
organizational structure, and operations�97 As a maritime force, it has a long- 
established cultural acceptance of the deception, masking, mobility, and impro-
vised independent operations that deployed ships have needed for survival in 
peace as well as war� At present, however, an assumption of uninterrupted com-
munications has diminished its institutional capacity to sail resiliently under the 
cyber “radar,” despite millions of opportunistic “hunters�” The newer forms of 
conflict enabled by cyberspace require a rediscovery of inclinations buried in 
the Navy’s history and culture and a repurposing of them for the new—much 
more complex, deceptive, and sensor-rich—environment� The “littoral” may be 
defined more in terms of what one keeps the enemy from easily knowing and how 
abruptly one can emerge in the enemy’s near proximity than of what beach needs 
to be crossed� The sociotechnical systems the service depends on today need to 
change, at the hands of officers and sailors who understand the basics of the cyber 
substrate as it is today and as it is evolving� We argue—though only time and trial 
by fire will confirm the proposition—that the Navy may be uniquely qualified to 
adapt to cybered conflict, if the research is done and the new sociotechnical lines 
of evolution are identified� 
A systemic understanding of cyber and research along lines identified above 
are needed not only for the Navy but also for the nation as a whole, if the Navy 
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is to develop its portion of national cyber power� In the coming transitional cy-
bered conflict age, cyber power will rest on a balance between the resilience of 
the system being attacked and that system’s ability to reach forward and disrupt 
in advance the small numbers of very skilled wicked actors able to overcome that 
resilience� This balance of resilience and disruption will apply to the Navy as 
well as the nation as a whole� When it is achieved, the nation will have in effect 
pursued an overarching cyber “security resilience” strategy redressing the advan-
tages that today cyberspace gives the offense� Effective and robust cyber power 
diminishes the value of any adversary’s “counterresilience” strategies intended 
to wear down deceptively the resilience of the defender’s whole socio-technical-
economic system� 
Today the United States has allies who are well intentioned but simply cannot 
find the economic resources to invest in the cyber security that they know their 
economic, critical infrastructure, and national-security systems require� When a 
service or nation becomes a cyber power, it will have greater freedom of choice 
in the coming transitional era and better chances of maintaining that power in 
the era that will follow� The more the Navy is able to answer the systemic cyber 
challenges and reduce the scale, proximity, and precision advantages attackers 
enjoy today, the better prepared it will be for the bordered, encrypted, and tech-
nologically diverse future international system� The more systemically the Navy 
contributes to its own cyber security, the more critical a player it will be in ensur-
ing the cyber power and the well-being of the nation as a whole, as the cybered 
world gradually restructures itself in response to global economic, demographic, 
technological, and security challenges�
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